论文部分内容阅读
考虑到国外企业的技术领先优势,在政府给予国内企业研发投入补贴和产品补贴2种情形下,分别建立了混合双寡头三阶段博弈模型,分析了国外企业竞争下的国内企业研发补贴策略.得出了在研发投入补贴与产品补贴情形时国内企业的均衡产出、研发投入、最优社会福利以及政府的补贴总额.结果表明,研发投入补贴策略下的均衡产出和最优社会福利比产品补贴策略下的均衡产出和最优社会福利低;研发投入补贴策略下的最优研发投入低于产品补贴下的最优研发投入;研发产品补贴策略对企业研发投入具有更明显的激励效应.在国外企业技术领先优势下,政府为激励国内企业研发创新提供产品补贴策略要优于研发投入补贴策略.
Taking into account the technological leading edge of foreign enterprises, under the two conditions of R & D investment subsidy and product subsidy given by the government, the three-stage mixed duopoly game model was established respectively, and the domestic enterprises R & D subsidy strategy under the competition of foreign enterprises was analyzed. The results show that the equilibrium output and the optimal social welfare under the R & D subsidy strategy are higher than those of the products The equilibrium output and the optimal social welfare under the subsidy strategy are low; the optimal R & D investment under R & D subsidy strategy is lower than the optimal R & D investment under product subsidy; R & D subsidy strategy has a more obvious incentive effect on R & D investment. Under the technological leadership of foreign enterprises, the government’s strategy of subsidizing products to encourage R & D of domestic enterprises is superior to that of R & D subsidies.