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国外经验研究表明,高管层会通过股票期权授予(或行权)时点的机会主义选择,或围绕股票期权授予(或行权)的价值相关信息披露的机会主义择时等方法影响行权价格(或公司股价),以最大化自己的股票期权价值。机会主义择时会损害股东利益,增加权益资本成本。通过规范相关信息披露,完善董事会等公司治理机制,可以抑制股权激励机会主义择时。文章从授权和行权两方面剖析了国外股票期权激励机会主义择时研究的最新进展,并对现有研究进行了评析,以期为深化正在起步的国内相关研究提供启示。
Foreign experience shows that senior management will influence the exercise of rights through the opportunistic choice of the time when the stock options are granted (or exercised) or the timing of opportunism based on value-related information disclosure (or exercise) of the stock options Price (or company stock price) to maximize the value of your stock options. The timing of opportunism will damage the interests of shareholders and increase the cost of equity capital. By regulating the disclosure of relevant information and perfecting the corporate governance mechanism such as the board of directors, the timing of equity incentive opportunism can be restrained. The paper analyzes the latest research progress on the opportunistic timing of foreign stock option incentive from two aspects: the authorization and the exercise of the right of exercise, and reviews the existing research in order to provide some enlightenment for deepening the domestic related research.