本文探讨了在高管报酬激励不足和激励过度两种不同情形下,政府所有权和盈余管理对高管报酬激励的影响。研究表明:在高管报酬激励不足时,政府所有权高的上市公司激励不足的现象更严重;在高管报酬激励过度时,政府所有权低的上市公司过度激励的现象更严重。此外,在报酬激励不足时,高管会通过盈余管理增加自身报酬。当总经理兼任董事长时,高管权力膨胀导致其运用权力提高自身报酬,使激励不足的现象减轻,激励过度的现象加重。 This article explores the impact of government ownership and earnings management on executive compensation incentives under two different scenarios: under-incentive remuneration and over-incentive. The research shows that: when the reward of senior executives is not enough, the under-incentive of listed companies with high government ownership is more serious; when the remuneration incentive of executives is excessive, the over-incentive of listed companies with low government ownership is more serious. In addition, senior managers add to their own earnings through earnings management when incentive incentives are inadequate. When the general manager serves as the chairman of the board of directors, the expansion of executive power leads to the use of power to raise his own remuneration, reducing the lack of motivation and exacerbating the excessive motivation.