本章对知识“基础”的观点的主要批判加以概述。这种观点对证明主义来说是不可缺少的。本章在某种意义上是对一种无效做法的总的考察:如果这种批判被理解为是对传统观点的一个毁灭性论证的话(而不是从内部作精细的修改),那么证明主义者大概会放弃元理论,与此相反,这一批判加强了从古典主义到新证明主义的转变;由于发现并不存在知识的坚固基础,这些理论家便试图在或然性的基础上建立人类的知识,以便避开怀疑论。虽然更为悲哀但也更为“明智”,他们承认科学合理性的局限,并企图承认将事实的相对性纳入当代经验主 This chapter summarizes the main criticisms of the “foundational” perspective of knowledge. This view is indispensable for proofism. This chapter is in some ways the general examination of an ineffective practice: if such criticism is to be understood as a devastating argument against a traditional view, not as a finer modification from within, the proverb is probably On the contrary, this critique reinforces the shift from classicism to neo-proofism, and since it has been found that there is no solid basis for knowledge, these theorists attempt to establish human knowledge on the basis of probability In order to avoid skepticism. Although more sad but also more “sensible,” they acknowledge the limits of scientific rationality and attempt to recognize the incorporation of the relativity of facts into the contemporary experience of the Lord