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在收益共享寄售契约下的两级供应链中,供应商向零售商报告其生产成本;零售商根据供应商报告的生产成本,决定零售商的收益分配比例;供应商决定零售价格和生产数量,并且保持产品的所有权.由于信息不对称,供应商可能谎报其生产成本.作者应用博弈论分析了供应商谎报行为对供应链及其成员决策及绩效的影响.利用解析的方法得出一些理论结果:零售价格在信息对称时小于生产成本信息不对称时;订货数量在信息对称时大于生产成本信息不对称时;零售商的利润分配比例在信息对称时大于生产成本信息不对称时.供应商的谎报行为使其自身利润增加,使零售商和供应链的利润减少.
In the two-tier supply chain under the revenue-sharing consignment contract, the supplier reports the production cost to the retailer; the retailer determines the retailer’s profit distribution proportion based on the production cost reported by the supplier; the supplier determines the retail price and the production quantity, And maintain the ownership of the product.Because of the asymmetric information, the supplier may misrepresent the cost of production.The author uses the game theory to analyze the influence of the supplier’s misleading behavior on the decision-making and performance of the supply chain and its members, and draws some theoretical results : When the retail price is less than the production cost when the information is asymmetric, the information asymmetry; when the quantity of the order is greater than the production cost information asymmetry when the information is symmetrical; when the retailer’s profit distribution proportion is greater than the production cost information asymmetry when the information is symmetric, Misleading behavior increases its own profits, reducing profits for retailers and supply chains.