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考虑一个由一家在位许可企业与多家寡头企业组成的网络产品市场,分析当产品具有网络效应时在位许可企业在固定费许可下最优的许可证数问题,证明在位企业是否进行许可、进行独家还是多家许可受到网络效应强度、市场容量、市场集中度、研发效率的影响。当市场容量较小时,在位企业将垄断;当市场容量足够大时,许可总是最优的——若网络强度较小,无论市场集中度如何,多家许可均优于独家许可;若网络强度适中,对市场上具有研发潜力的企业都进行许可较优;若网络强度很大,在市场集中度较大时,多家许可优于独家许可;若市场集中度较小,则进行独家许可还是多家许可取决于发放许可证数。另外在许可企业不能实行价格歧视时,最优的固定费随着受许企业整体研发效率和许可证数的提高而减小。
Consider a network product market consisting of a reputable licensee and a number of oligopolies analyzing the number of licenses licensed under a flat fee license when the product has a network effect to prove whether the licensee is licensed , Exclusive or multiple licenses subject to network effects, market capacity, market concentration, research and development efficiency. When the market capacity is small, the incumbent will monopolize. When the market capacity is large enough, the license is always optimal. If the network strength is small, more licenses are better than the exclusive license regardless of market concentration. If the network With moderate intensity, and better licensed companies with research and development potentials in the market. If the network strength is high, multiple licenses are better than exclusive licenses when the market concentration is high, and exclusive licenses if the market concentration is small Depending on the number of licenses issued, or more licenses. In addition, when licensees can not enforce price discrimination, the optimal fixed fee will decrease as the overall R & D efficiency and license number of the licensee increases.