论文部分内容阅读
公司债权人治理效应的发挥,依赖于负债融资的特征和债权人的监督、干预行为对公司治理产生的外部性作用。重点关注金融关联这一非正式制度安排对民营公司债权人外部性治理效应产生的影响。选取2009~2012年民营上市公司面板数据为研究样本,分析民营公司债权人外部性治理效应及金融关联的调节作用。研究发现,短期借款对代理成本的外部性治理效应显著,而长期借款却推升了民营上市公司的代理成本;金融关联能够稀释短期借款的治理作用,而在长期借款与代理成本的关系中却未表现出显著的调节效应。
The exertion of corporate creditor’s governance depends on the characteristics of debt financing and the supervision of creditors, and the external effect of intervention on corporate governance. It focuses on the impact of the informal financial arrangements on the governance of the externalities of private company creditors. Select the panel data of private listed companies from 2009 to 2012 as a sample to analyze the external governance effect of private company creditors and the regulatory role of financial linkages. The study finds that the short-term borrowing has a significant effect on the external governance of agency costs, while the long-term borrowing has promoted the agency costs of private listed companies. The financial linkages can dilute the governance role of short-term borrowings. However, in the relationship between long-term loans and agency costs Did not show a significant regulatory effect.