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通过对业主、监理与承包商三者在工程质量上的合谋模型分析,得到了业主防止合谋的条件和保证业主利益最大化的打击合谋的最优概率,并得出一个反应业主防合谋能力的临界值,业主是否需要激励监理取决与业主的实际防合谋能力与临界值对应的防合谋能力的对比,而业主对合谋主体的惩罚系数对临界值的影响完全相反值得注意。
Through the analysis of the collusion between the project owner, the supervisor and the contractor on the project quality, the optimal probability of preventing collusion and maximizing the interests of the owners are obtained, and an optimal probability of counteracting conspiracy is obtained. The critical value, whether the owners need incentive supervision depends on the comparison of the actual collusion-preventing capabilities and the collusion-preventing capabilities of the owners, and it is worth noticing that the owners’ influence of the collusion coefficient on the critical value is completely opposite.