基于委托代理模型较为系统地研究了中央政府和地方政府在耕地保护过程中的代理风险和代理成本,探讨在信息不对称条件下构建耕地保护补偿机制的可行性,论证了中央政府通过财政转移支付来补偿地方政府耕地保护的方法,为破解耕地保护困境提供理论依据,进而提出构建耕地保护补偿机制的对策建议。 Based on the principal-agent model, the agency risks and agency costs of the central and local governments in the process of arable land protection are systematically studied. The feasibility of constructing the arable land compensation system under the condition of information asymmetry is discussed. To compensate the local government for the protection of cultivated land, provide a theoretical basis for solving the plight of cultivated land protection, and then put forward the countermeasures and suggestions for constructing compensation mechanism for cultivated land protection.