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排除式唯物主义即这一论题:我们关于心理现象的常识观念所构成的是一个完全虚假的理论,它存在着根本的缺陷,因此无论它的基本原理还是它的本体论都将被完备的神经科学所取代,而不是被神经科学平稳地还原。我们的相互理解乃至我们的内省都可以在成熟的神经科学的概念框架内重新构建,与之所取代的常识心理学相比,我们可以期待神经科学有大得多的威力,而且在一般意义的物理科学范围内实质上更加完整。
Excludable materialism is the subject: our common-sense idea of psychological phenomena constitutes a completely false theory, which has fundamental flaws, so that neither its underlying principle nor its ontology will be completely neurotic Science instead of being steadily restored by neuroscience. Our mutual understanding, and even our introspection, can be reconstructed within the conceptual framework of a well-established neuroscience, and we can expect much more power in neuroscience than the common-sense psychology that it replaces, and in the general sense The physical sciences are substantially more complete.