论文部分内容阅读
为了提高机场业的效率,促使机场管理从公共事业管理向市场化管理转变,2000年5月,德国政府开始对汉堡机场试行价格上限收费规制,以代替1980年以来的成本加成规制。成本加成收费规制会产生“阿维基—约翰逊效用”,使生产效率低下,不能给予机场开发非航空收入的激励,致使收费水平过高,机场容量配置不当,规制成本太高。新的价格上限规制不再实行单一预算,只对机场航空收费进行规制,强调质量监督和磋商原则。在权衡航空公司和机场两年来对价格上限规制的反映后,德国政府决定于第二个规制合同年限内实行滑动费率价格规制。
In order to improve the efficiency of the airport industry and promote the change of airport management from public utility management to market-oriented management, in May 2000, the German government started to impose price cap charging on Hamburg Airport instead of the cost plus regulation since 1980. The cost-plus-charge regulation will produce “the A-Key-Johnson utility”, which will make the production inefficient. It will not give airports incentives to develop non-aeronautical revenues. As a result, charges will be too high, airport capacity will not be properly configured, and regulatory costs will be too high. The new price cap regulation will no longer implement a single budget, only the regulation of airport aviation charges, emphasizing the principle of quality supervision and consultation. After weighing up the price ceiling regulation over the past two years between airlines and airports, the German government decided to impose a sliding tariff on the second regulatory contract.