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以特许经营基础设施工程为研究对象,建立了公共部门,建设及服务提供方和私人投资方的三方合作博弈模型,利用Shapley值法分析了三者在基础设施工程融资联盟中的合作收益分配问题。计算了三种融资模式下各参与方的合作收益分配值,并对不同融资联盟模式对利益分配的影响进行了分析。研究表明:如果融资联盟参与方实际承担的风险大于期望风险时,其原合作收益分配量会增加,如果小于期望风险则原合作收益分配量会减小。同时,在特许经营管理的基础设施工程融资联盟中当参与方的合作形式发生变化时,其各方所承担的实际风险会发生转移,从而影响联盟参与方的最终合作收益分配量。对于基础设施工程中融资联盟及参与方的合作机制与利益分配方式的研究对解决基础设施工程管理中的合作协调问题具有重要的启发意义和参考借鉴作用。
Taking the franchising infrastructure project as the research object, this paper establishes a three-party cooperation game model of public sector, construction and service providers and private investors. The Shapley value method is used to analyze the cooperative income distribution among the three parties in the infrastructure project financing alliance . The value of cooperation income distribution of each participant under the three financing modes is calculated, and the impact of different financing alliance modes on the distribution of benefits is analyzed. The research shows that if the actual participation risk of the financing alliance participants is greater than the expected risk, the original cooperative income distribution will increase, and if less than the expected risk, the original cooperative income distribution will decrease. In the meantime, when the forms of cooperation of the participants in the franchise-managed infrastructure engineering financing alliance change, the actual risks borne by all parties will shift, which will affect the ultimate cooperative profit distribution of alliance participants. The research on the cooperation mechanism and the profit distribution mode of the financing alliance and the participants in the infrastructure project has important enlightenment significance and reference for solving the cooperation and coordination in the infrastructure project management.