通过 N个发电商的古诺博弈模型 ,研究了统一的边际出清电价机制对发电商持留容量的激励作用 ,在短期市场没有容量增加、市场信息对政府和监管机构是完备的、发电商具有线性边际成本并且是规模不等的情况下得出了持留行为均衡的解析解。该解与发电商的市场份额和Herfindahl- Hirschman指标有关 ,并得出每个发电商容量持留的市场临界需求水平 ,进而提出了电力市场监督指标的一级预警负荷水平、二级预警负荷水平和三级预警负荷水平。 The Cournot game model of N generators is used to study the incentive effect of the unified marginal clearing mechanism on the holding capacity of generators. There is no capacity increase in the short-term market. The market information is complete for the government and regulators, and the generators have Linear marginal costs and the scale is not equal to the analytical solution of the equilibrium of the holding behavior. The solution is related to the market share of generators and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, and draws the critical market demand for each capacity of generators, and then puts forward the first-level pre-warning load level, the second-level pre-warning load level and Three levels of early warning load.