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高管薪酬一直以来是一个关注多、争议大的话题,近年来,高管自定薪酬频繁见诸于媒体。09年财政部一系列规范性文件下发后,绩效考核、薪酬管理政策在国企高管中逐步发挥效用,与此同时,我们也看到企业高管运用权力、并购等隐蔽性的自由裁量性投资行为自定高薪,导致绩效考核方式严重无效。未来政策制定应密切关注管理权力以及自由裁量性投资行为在激励机制中可能存在的代理问题,进一步完善绩效激励机制,合理引导和考核投资行为,健全公司治理机制,加强高管薪酬的信息披露等。
Executive pay has always been a topic of much concern and controversy. In recent years, executive pay has been frequently seen in the media. After the Ministry of Finance issued a series of normative documents in 2009, performance appraisal and remuneration management policies have gradually become effective in senior executives of state-owned enterprises. At the same time, we have also seen the covert discretionary power of corporate executives using mergers and acquisitions Self-determined high-paying investment behavior, resulting in serious performance appraisal invalid. In the future, policy making should pay close attention to the management power and discretionary investment behavior in the incentive mechanism may exist in the agency problem, and further improve the performance incentive mechanism, and reasonable guidance and assessment of investment behavior, improve the corporate governance mechanism, to enhance the disclosure of information such as executive compensation .