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本文从企业间网络关系视角研究企业间高管联结对财务重述行为扩散的影响。基于2003~2010年深沪两市A股上市公司的企业间高管联结与财务重述数据,研究发现,财务重述行为可以通过高管联结关系在企业之间进行扩散,即如果联结企业(与目标企业通过企业间高管联结关系联结的企业)发生过财务重述行为,那么目标企业发生财务重述的可能性增大。在进一步考察公司治理机制在此扩散效应中作用时,本文发现,部分公司治理机制在财务重述行为的企业间扩散过程中起到“防火墙”作用,即如果目标企业公司治理机制越好(独立董事比例越高、董事长与总经理两职分离、机构投资者持股比例越高),那么,目标公司受联结公司财务重述行为“传染”的可能性越小。这些发现不仅为财务重述行为研究提供了新的理论分析视角,还为监管部门规范财务重述行为提供了有益启示。
This article studies the impact of senior executives’ connection between enterprises on the spread of financial restatement from the perspective of the relationship between enterprises. Based on the data of senior executives’ connection and financial restatement between A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2003 to 2010, the study found that the financial restatement behavior can spread among the senior executives through the connection of executives, that is, And the target business through the inter-corporate executives linkages between enterprises) had a financial restatement behavior, then the target company increased the possibility of financial restatement. In further examining the role of corporate governance in this diffusion effect, this paper finds that some corporate governance mechanisms play a “firewall” role in the diffusion of inter-firm financial restatements. That is, if the target corporate governance mechanism is more Good (the higher the proportion of independent directors, the separation of the two roles of chairman and general manager, institutional investors, the higher the proportion of shares), then the target company by the joint financial restatement behavior “less likely”. These findings not only provide a new perspective of theoretical analysis for the research of financial restatement, but also provide useful enlightenment for regulators to regulate the financial restatement.