本文以研发方议价能力为控制变量,以出资方在研发联盟中获得的相对控制权为因变量,对中国制药产业1999～2002年 102个有效研发联盟合约样本进行了研究,证明了阿吉恩和泰勒尔的两个假设:出资方议价能力越强,控制权越应配置给出资方;项目越处于研究开发的初始阶段,控制权越应分配给研发方。本研究还证明了出资方的实际出资额(技术价格)是决定控制权分配的更重要的因素。 In this paper, the bargaining power of R & D as control variables, the relative control power obtained by the R & D alliance in the R & D alliance as the dependent variable, a sample of 102 valid R & D alliance contracts in China’s pharmaceutical industry from 1999 to 2002 was studied, And Taylor’s two hypotheses: the stronger the bargaining power of the investor, the more control should be allocated to the investor; the more the project is in the initial stage of research and development, the more control should be allocated to the R & D side. This study also proves that the actual contribution of the sponsor (technology price) is a more important factor that determines the distribution of control.