在双重道德风险下,保险公司若想使收益不减少,必须加大检查力度(成本),同时也要有相应的机制来约束和规避不良风险的发生。但是保险公司实施对投保人告知实情的奖励措施,虽然不会使保险公司受益进一步提升,但是却可以改善社会总福利。 Under the double moral hazard, if the insurance company wants to make the income not reduce, it must increase the inspection intensity (cost), at the same time, it must also have the corresponding mechanism to restrain and avoid the occurrence of the bad risk. However, the implementation of incentives for insurance companies to inform the policyholders about the actual situation will not improve the overall interests of the insurance companies even though they will not benefit the insurance companies further.