在将盈余管理按操纵利润的方向不同细分为正向和负向盈余管理,并详细探讨了正、负向盈余管理的性质、适用范围及其给注册会计师带来的法律风险差异的基础上,对政治关联企业审计师选择的策略进行了重新审视和研究。研究发现,政治关联企业在正向和负向盈余管理上均表现出高于非政治关联企业的利润操纵行为。负向盈余管理的政治关联企业更倾向于选择大所,同时,大所也有更高的可能对其财务报告签发清洁审计意见。相反,正向盈余管理的政治关联企业更偏好聘请小所,且小所也愿意对其财务报告出具标准审计意见。 Based on the difference between the positive and negative earnings management of Earnings Management in the direction of operating profits and the nature and scope of the positive and negative Earnings Management as well as the differences in legal risk to Certified Public Accountants , Re-examine and study the strategies chosen by political-related corporate auditors. The study found that political affiliates showed higher profit manipulation than non-political affiliates in both positive and negative earnings management. Political affiliates with negative earnings management are more likely to choose big firms, while Big firms also have a higher chance of issuing clean audit opinions on their financial reports. On the contrary, political affiliates with positive earnings management prefer to hire small firms and they are also willing to issue standard auditing opinions on their financial reports.