The Economic Consequences of Social Distancing 社交隔离的经济后果

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  The biggest threat posed by the covid-19 outbreak is, of course, the health risks it poses. But that is not the only risk: Avoidance, social distancing and panic may have enormous economic consequences, large enough to significantly slow growth, push up unemployment and even tip the economy into a recession.
   On this front, the most vulnerable people are low-wage workers in low-income households without paid leave. Many employers are already telling their white-collar workers to work from home. But low-wage workers such as janitors, food service workers and retail cashiers can’t work remotely, and they also often work for contractors2 with less-enlightened policies. If these workers are temporarily idled by specific quarantines, school closures affecting their children or workplace closures motivated by general social distancing efforts, they won’t get paid. Their families tend to have little savings and live in an economically precarious state even in good times. Without work, these families face near-term risks of intense economic hardship and possible eviction.
   So we need a quickly implementable policy that will maintain earnings for those who most depend on them. Many of these workers will be employed but temporarily idled; others may lose jobs as their employers try to manage shocks to their own businesses.
   Unemployment insurance (UI) is the first line of defense in a downturn. In fact, workers who are able and available for work but are barred from their workplaces or otherwise idled are often eligible for unemployment benefits. But the UI system is not ready for the scale of claims that could result, and some state systems may not be set up to accommodate quarantined workers or caregivers. Often, UI benefits aren’t paid for several weeks, but workers will need money before that. Moreover, many low-wage workers who are most in need of assistance have interrupted work histories that do not qualify them for UI benefits.
   A better solution is for employers to continue paying workers directly during shutdowns. In most cases, employers will want the workers back once the threat of the virus recedes, and continuation of wage and salary payments will help meet these workers’ and their households’ needs while supporting consumer spending in the broader economy.
   According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, about 40 percent of private-sector workers paid below the median lack paid leave benefits. That’s about 23 million workers, with average hourly wages around $14. To help them through what we believe will be an extremely challenging period, we propose the creation of a temporary, national paid-leave program, funded by the federal government, for workers idled due to the coronavirus.    Here’s how it would work. Employers would continue to pay workers who are prevented from working by the virus, through direct deposits or paychecks in the mail. They would report this to their state UI system, which would reimburse them through tax credits or direct payments and would in turn be reimbursed by the federal government.
   Based on our experience working in the Obama administration on UI expansions during the Great Recession, this would be administratively challenging, but manageable, especially with extra federal dollars to expand UI administrative capacity. The specific implementation might vary across states. For example, California already has a state paid-leave program and might find it easier to administer this program through that. But the idea would be to reimburse employers for paying their workers through their coronavirus-caused leave, with as little disruption as possible.
   This program would need to be strictly time limited—it is not intended to be permanent. It would be tied to local health authorities’ or the CDC’s recommendations about prudent responses. It would be important to have two separate triggers: One when authorities recommend that sick or vulnerable individuals stay home, which would trigger benefits just for these workers and for affected caregivers; and another if authorities recommend that larger groups take these social-distancing measures, which would trigger benefits for everyone affected.
   The program would provide an essential lifeline for workers. It would also support employers, many of whom recognize the hardship that shutdowns will impose on loyal workers but whose hands will be forced as quarantines reduce their revenue streams to a trickle. An assist from the government will help these employers do what they know is right and will make it easier to restart their businesses when the health threat passes.
   Because so much more is unknown than known about the spread of the virus and potential public health responses, coming up with a reliable cost estimate for our proposal is impossible. But if half of lower-wage workers without paid leave can’t go to work, replacing their paychecks would have a monthly cost of around $20 billion. If quarantines are localized to particular areas, the cost would be much lower, but an attractive attribute of the program is that it would contract or expand with need.
   Borrowing costs for the federal government are remarkably low right now, so the program would be inexpensive to finance. But even were that not the case, we’d still pull for this sort of intervention. Ripple effects from quarantines risk devastating our economy, as workers without incomes have nothing to spend. “Countercyclical spending”—temporarily ramping up government support in periods of economic disruptions—has a long and venerable track record of helping both economically vulnerable families and the broader economy.    As this crisis unfolds, the Trump administration will be forced to launch some sort of fiscal response to offset the economic impact of the virus. The question is: Will the measures it deploys be targeted to those who need them, or will it default to their knee-jerk, muscle-memory, tax-cut mode? Millions of households who are on the precipice3 of economic despair depend on policymakers getting this right.
  新冠肺炎爆發所造成的最大威胁,毫无疑问是随之而来的健康风险。但那并非唯一风险:回避、社交隔离和恐慌可能会带来巨大的经济后果,大到足以严重拖慢增长、推高失业率,乃至使经济陷入衰退。
  在这方面,最脆弱的群体是来自低收入家庭没有带薪假期的低薪工人。 许多雇主已让其白领雇员在家工作。 但是,低薪工人(例如清洁工、餐饮业服务工人和零售业收银员)无法远程工作,而且他们通常也为政策不太开明的合同雇主工作。如果这些人因具体的隔离措施、孩子学校停课或关闭工作场所等一般性社交隔离措施而赋闲,他们将没有报酬。 他们的家庭往往积蓄微薄,即使在好年景也难免捉襟见肘。 失去工作,这些家庭短期内就会面临剧烈的经济困难,乃至被房东驱逐。
  因此亟需可以迅速落实的政策,以使得对收入最依赖的人群能维持收入。这些工人中许多人将被雇用,但暂时空闲;其他人可能会失去工作,因为雇主要设法应对自己生意面对的冲击。
  失业保险(UI)是低迷时期的第一道防线。其实,有能力且可以工作但被禁止进入工作场所或因其他原因闲散的工人通常有资格领取失业救济金。 但UI系统尚未准备好应对可能产生的索赔规模,而且某些州系统也没准备好吸纳被隔离的工人或看护人员。UI福利通常几周后才支付,但工人们在那之前就会缺钱。此外,许多最需要帮助的低薪工人工作经历不连续,因而没有领取UI福利的资格。
  优化解决方案之一,是由雇主在停工期间继续直接向工人发薪。多数情况下,一旦病毒威胁消失,雇主就会希望工人返岗,继续支付薪资有助于满足这些工人及其家庭的需求,且有利于宏观经济中的消费者支出。
  根据(美国)劳工统计局的数据,在工资低于中位数的私营部门工人中,约40%没有带薪假福利。这群工人总数大约有2300万,平均小时工资约为14 美元。我们认为会有一段极端挑战时期,为了帮助因冠状病毒而赋闲的工人安然渡过,我们建议设立一个由联邦政府出资的临时性的全国带薪休假计划。
  运作方式如下:雇主继续通过直接打款或邮寄支票的方式,向因病毒感染而无法工作的工人付薪。他们将其申报给所在州失业保险系统,系统将通过税收抵免或直接付款予以报销,并最终向联邦政府报销。
  根据我们在大衰退期间在奥巴马政府中进行的失业保险扩张工作的经验,这项工作管理上具有挑战性,但可以操作,尤其是用额外的联邦资金来扩充失业保险的管理能力。具体实现可能因州而异。例如,加利福尼亚州已经有其州带薪休假计划,并且可能会发现通过既有计划更容易管理本计划。总之,这个理念就是,雇主在冠状病毒引起的赋闲期间发生的人工支出应予报销,尽量减少中断。
  本计划设立严格的时限——计划不是永久性的。计划将与地方卫生部门或CDC关于谨慎应对的建议相挂钩。重要的是要有两个单独的触发因素:一是当局建议患病或脆弱的人居家时,这只会使这些工人和受影响的看护人员获益;二是如果当局建议更大的群体采取这些社交隔离措施,这将会使所有受影响的人获益。
  本计划将为工人提供不可或缺的生命线。这也将为雇主提供支持。许多雇主也能认识到停工将使忠诚的工人生计维艰,但也是形势所迫,因为隔离措施导致业务收入缩水。政府的协助有助于雇主做出正确的行动,更易于在健康威胁过去后重启生意。
  由于对病毒的传播和潜在的公共卫生应对措施知之甚少,因此不可能针对我们的提案做出可靠的成本估算。但是,如果一半无带薪假的低薪工人无法工作,承包他们的薪水每月将产生约200亿美元的成本。如果隔离只限于特定地区,则成本会低得多,但是本计划一个吸引人的特点在于,它可根据需要收缩或扩展。
  目前,联邦政府的借贷成本非常低,因此该计划的融资成本不高。但即使不是这样,我们仍然会支持这类干预措施。隔离产生的涟漪效应有可能摧毁我们的经济,因为工人没有收入就没有钱可以消费。 “逆周期支出”——即在经济动荡时期临时增加政府支持——在帮助经济脆弱的家庭和经济大环境方面有着悠久的历史和良好的口碑。
  随着危机的蔓延,特朗普政府将被迫采取某种财政应对措施,以抵消病毒的经济冲击。问题是:采取的措施是否针对需要的人,还是政府会下意识采取惯用的减税模式?数以百万计的家庭正因严峻的经济形势而濒临绝境,他们指望着政策制定者能不走错路。      □
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