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考察外部劳动力市场上雇主企业年金支出的激励机制.建立一个信号博弈模型,雇主拥有私人信息,通过企业年金支出塑造声誉吸引人才.引入信号成本与信号间的随机关系和雇员的不完美观察,考察雇主的最优信号成本决策.给出了最优信号成本的图形解和算例,并考察了均衡稳定性以及不完美观察对最优信号成本的影响.研究发现:稳定的零均衡必然存在;多均衡下是否存在信号成本支出不确定;观察完美程度与信号成本的关系不确定.这表明外部劳动力市场上雇主提供企业年金的激励不足,推动企业年金发展尚需提高雇主的收益.
Incentives to investigate the employer’s annuity expenditure in the external labor market are set up, a signal game model is established, the employer has private information, and the reputation is drawn through the enterprise annuity spending to attract talent.This paper introduces the stochastic relationship between signal cost and signal and the imperfect observation of employees, The optimal signal cost decision of the employer is given.The graphical solution and the example of the optimal signal cost are given and the influence of the equalization stability and the imperfection on the optimal signal cost is investigated.The results show that the stable zero balance must exist, There is uncertainty about whether there is a signal cost under multiple equilibria or not, and the relationship between perfection and signal cost is uncertain, which shows that employers in the external labor market are not motivated to provide enterprise annuity, and that the promotion of enterprise annuity still needs to increase employers’ returns.