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针对国有农业企业的特质,本文构建了国有农业企业经营者的多任务委托代理模型,分析了国有农业企业经营者的激励要素及关联关系。研究发现,当国有农业企业经营者在赢利性目标和社会性目标方面的努力产生不同的业绩信息且前者业绩信息对后者业绩信息具有极大影响时,经营者具有独立的多项工作任务且工作任务努力的激励成本之间相互独立,那么激励相容条件下赢利性工作任务的最优业绩报酬受到社会性工作上努力的边际收益的影响;最优业绩报酬是绝对风险规避度、边际激励成本变化率和可观测变量方差的递减函数。
In view of the characteristics of state-owned agricultural enterprises, this paper constructs multitasking principal-agent model of the state-owned agricultural enterprise managers and analyzes the incentive elements and their relations of the managers of state-owned agricultural enterprises. The study found that when the state-owned agricultural enterprise managers’ efforts on profit-making goals and social goals produce different performance information and the former performance information has a great impact on the latter’s performance information, the operators have a number of independent tasks The motivation costs of work tasks are independent of each other. So, the optimal performance pay of profit work tasks under incentive compatibility conditions is affected by the marginal revenue of social work efforts. The optimal performance pay is absolute risk aversion and marginal incentive The rate of change of cost and the decreasing function of variance of observable variables.