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我国《反垄断法》中的转售价格维持正在面临着本土化移植的两难困境。该行为在经济学中具有两种对立的理论,在实务界存在欧美两套迥异的执法模式。这些冲突诱发了我国反垄断执法的异化,即行政执法机构与司法机构各执一端、各行其是。该问题的法学症结在于我国《反垄断法》对于由谁来承担该行为具有排除限制竞争效果的举证责任规定不明。本文发现司法机构的做法虽然合理,却不合法;行政执法机构的做法虽然合法,但不合理。最后,本文对我国《反垄断法》的本土化制约性要素进行分析,提出了转售价格维持的本土化执法路径,即由行政执法机构或原告来承担该行为具有排除限制竞争效果的举证责任。
Resale price in China’s “Anti-monopoly Law” is still facing the dilemma of localization migration. This behavior has two opposite theories in economics. There are two very different modes of law enforcement in Europe and the United States in practice. These conflicts have induced the alienation of our country’s antitrust law enforcement, that is, the administrative law enforcement agencies and the judiciary have their own ends and go its own course. The crux of the law lies in the fact that the provisions of the Anti-Monopoly Law of our country have no clear indication of the burden of proof on the parties who bear the burden of provoking the competition. This article finds that though the practice of the judiciary is reasonable, it is not legal. Although the practice of administrative law enforcement agencies is legal, it is unreasonable. Finally, this article analyzes the restrictive elements of the localization of “Anti-monopoly Law” in our country and puts forward the localization of the law enforcement of resale price maintenance, that is, the burden of proof by the administrative law enforcement agencies or the plaintiff to assume the effect of excluding the restricted competition .