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文章研究的是腐败路径的选择及其变化的内生微观机制。在完全信息、制度环境不变、社会成员同质条件下,存在两个稳定的腐败均衡;当社会成员非集体理性行为不受约束时,腐败将成为行为人占优策略,全社会也会因之陷入高腐败均衡“陷阱”。在模型引入社会资本因素后,我们发现,在制度环境不变的条件下,信息不完全、社会成员的异质性、相互信任程度和腐败环境,是可能引起腐败路径转变的关键因素。上述理论分析得到了微观经验数据逻辑回归结果的支持。
The article studies the choice of path of corruption and its endogenous micro-mechanism of change. Under the conditions of complete information and institutional environment and equal conditions of social members, there are two stable equilibriums of corruption; when non-collective rational acts of society members are not bound, corruption will become the predominant strategy of the perpetrator and the whole society will be affected by Caught in a highly corrupt equilibrium “trap ”. After the introduction of social capital into the model, we found that the incomplete information, the heterogeneity of social members, the degree of mutual trust and the corrupt environment under the conditions of institutional environment are the key factors that may cause the path of corruption to change. The above theoretical analysis has been supported by the logistic regression results of micro-empirical data.