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本文从代理问题的视角探究上市公司管理层在制定股权激励方案中的绩效考核指标时,是否有预算松驰及相关公司治理措施对抑制这种机会主义行为是否有作用。根据沪深两市观测数据分析表明:大部分企业的股权激励方案中存在预算松驰;代理成本与预算松弛显著正相关,国有企业的预算松弛程度显著大于非国有企业;股权集中度与预算松弛显著负相关关系;设置薪酬委员会及董事长与总经理分离对预算松驰有抑制作用。
From the perspective of agency problems, this article explores whether the management of listed companies in the development of performance evaluation indicators in the equity incentive plan, whether there is budget relaxation and related corporate governance measures to curb this opportunistic behavior. According to the analysis of the observation data of Shanghai and Shenzhen cities, it shows that there are budget slacks in the equity incentive plans of most companies; the agency costs are significantly positively correlated with the relaxation of the budget; the state-owned enterprises’ budget relaxation is significantly greater than that of non-state-owned enterprises; and the concentration of ownership and budget are loosened. There is a significant negative correlation; setting the separation of the remuneration committee and the chairman of the board from the general manager has an inhibitory effect on budget relaxation.