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创业投资有限合伙制中的报酬机制借鉴了保险市场解决道德风险的一个次优解决方案,是一种折衷的分成激励机制。这一方案虽然具有一定的制度比较优势,但从激励的角度研究创业投资有限合伙制度有其自身的制度缺陷。本文基于代理关系对创业投资有限合伙制构建了一个传统的报酬激励模型,通过最优化原理对创业投资的最优契约安排进行了分析,认为,创业投资有限合伙制对激励与约束创业投资家具有一些制度上的缺陷,并提出以下解决的措施:增加创业投资家的收益分成比例β值;改变个人资金的注入方式和转变报酬的支付模式;构建创业投资家的声誉机制。
The compensation mechanism in the limited partnership of venture capital investment draws on a suboptimal solution to the moral hazard in the insurance market and is a compromise incentive mechanism. Although this program has a certain system of comparative advantages, but from the perspective of incentive research venture capital limited partnership system has its own system defects. Based on the agency relationship, this paper constructs a traditional reward incentive model for venture capital limited partnership, and analyzes the optimal contractual arrangements of venture capital through the optimization principle. It is concluded that the limited partnership system of venture capital has a significant impact on the incentive and restriction of venture capitalists’ Some institutional defects, and put forward the following solutions: increase the proportion of venture capitalists into the share of β; change the injection of personal funds and change the mode of payment; build venture capitalist reputation mechanism.