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本文研究了二级证券市场上的主力异动事件和企业的政治关联资源将如何影响企业避税行为的激进度,进而考察政治成本之“矛”与政治关联之“盾”在上市公司纳税行为上的对立互生关系。实证结论发现:一方面,主力资金进入、退出、换手等事件的冲击均能给相关公司施加额外政治成本,进而在事件发生后的一段时期内提高企业的税收遵从意愿;另一方面,企业特有政治关联的保护伞功能可以弱化主力异动事件对企业税收遵从意愿的正向促动作用,说明企业拥有的政治关联可以减轻企业面临的政治成本。
This paper studies how the main changes in the secondary securities market and the political resources of the enterprises will affect the aggressiveness of the tax avoidance behavior of enterprises and then examines the relationship between the political cost and the political shield of the political shield in the listed companies Opposition and mutualism on tax behavior. The empirical results show that: on the one hand, the impact of major funds entering, exiting, changing hands and other incidents can impose additional political costs on the relevant companies and further raise the tax compliance wishes of enterprises during the period after the incident; on the other hand, The uniquely political function of umbrella can weaken the positive effect of the main transaction on corporate tax compliance, indicating that the political affiliations owned by enterprises can reduce the political costs faced by enterprises.