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对内地方保护与对外开放合作是我国地方政府行为的两个显著特征。本文通过一个简单的理论模型说明,晋升激励结构是决定中国地方政府在对内和对外行为选择差异的主要原因之一。在财政分权和地方政府竞争的条件下,中央政府以经济增长为核心的晋升锦标激励机制,导致地方政府实施地方保护和分割市场行为。而由于在对外合作中不存在晋升竞争的影响,使得地方政府积极开展对外经济合作。本文还进一步揭示了地方政府对内竞争与对外合作的动机、表现、后果,以及两种行为之间的内在联系,最后提出相关对策建议。
The cooperation between local protection and opening to the outside world is two notable features of the behavior of local governments in our country. This paper, through a simple theoretical model, shows that promotion of incentive structure is one of the main reasons that determine the differences in Chinese and foreign government behavior choices. Under the conditions of fiscal decentralization and competition from local governments, the central government has promoted the incentive mechanism with the core of economic growth and led the local governments to implement local protection and market segmentation. However, due to the fact that there is no influence of promotion competition in foreign cooperation, local governments are actively engaged in foreign economic cooperation. This article further reveals the motivation, performance, consequences and local relations between the two kinds of behaviors of the local governments in competition and cooperation with foreign countries. Finally, the paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions.