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针对当前风电并网困难问题,综合考虑常规能源发电企业、风电企业、电网企业与政府之间的相互关系,根据非合作博弈理论进行分析,结果证明:风电并网困难问题的解决归根结底取决于风电发展规模的大小;政府对电网企业允许或不允许风电并网的行为进行补贴或处罚,取决于“弃风”量的大小和电网改造升级的成本高低,并且无论补贴或是处罚对社会福利的影响都是等效的;当“弃风”量达到一定程度时,电网企业对电网的改造升级将由被动转为主动。
According to the current difficulties of wind power grid integration, considering the relationship between conventional energy power generation enterprises, wind power enterprises, power grid enterprises and the government, the analysis based on the non-cooperative game theory shows that the solution to the wind power grid integration problems ultimately depends on the wind power The size of the scale of development; government subsidies or penalties for grid companies to allow or not allow grid-connected wind power depends on the size of the “wind” and the cost of upgrading the grid, and whether subsidies or penalties for the community When the amount of “abandoning the wind” reaches a certain level, the transformation and upgrade of the power grid enterprises by the power grid enterprises will be turned from passive to active.