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Because of the concise functionality of oblivious transfer (OT) protocols, they have been widely used as building blocks in secure multiparty computation and high-level protocols. The security of OT protocols built upon classical number theoretic problems, such as the discrete logarithm and factoring, however, is threatened as a result of the huge progress in quantum computing. Therefore, post-quantum cryptography is needed for protocols based on classical problems, and several proposals for post-quantum OT protocols exist. However, most post-quantum cryptosystems present their security proof only in the context of classical adversaries, not in the quantum setting. In this paper, we close this gap and prove the security of the lattice-based OT protocol proposed by Peikert et al. (CRYPTO, 2008), which is universally composably secure under the assumption of leaing with errors hardness, in the quantum setting. We apply three general quantum security analysis frameworks. First, we apply the quantum lifting theorem proposed by Unruh (EUROCRYPT, 2010) to prove that the security of the lattice-based OT protocol can be lifted into the quantum world. Then, we apply two more security analysis frameworks specified for post-quantum cryptographic primitives, i.e., simple hybrid arguments (CRYPTO, 2011) and game-preserving reduction (PQCrypto, 2014).