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控制权收购可分为一次性收购和循序收购两种模式。文章认为循序收购可被归结为防御机制,这种防御机制旨在发现和约束那些可能对中小股东构成利益侵夺的收购方。文章在对1998-2006年中国A股市场发生的民营企业作为收购方的上市公司控制权收购案例进行研究后,发现具有潜在利益侵夺倾向的收购方更有可能选择循序收购而非一次性收购。这一发现将对公司治理中控股股东与其他中小股东利益冲突的研究从事后阶段推向了事前阶段。
Control acquisition can be divided into one-time acquisition and sequential acquisition of two modes. The article argues that sequential acquisitions can be attributed to defensive mechanisms that seek to identify and bind acquirers that may be of benefit to minority shareholders. After studying the acquisition of listed companies controlled by private companies in China’s A-share market from 1998 to 2006, the article finds that the acquirer with the potential profit infringement tendency is more likely to choose the sequential purchase rather than the one-time acquisition. This discovery will push the study of the conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and other small and medium-sized shareholders in corporate governance to the pre-stage.