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本文采用伯川德价格竞争模型研究两个地方政府如何制定税率来竞争一个外商投资项目。分析了企业在不同地区投资的价值由公有信息和私有信息组成时,投资环境的异同对于均衡税率的影响。若投资环境同质,两地方政府税率竞争均衡时税率为零;若投资环境对企业有差异,均衡税率大于零。两种情况下的均衡税率都低于社会福利最大化时的税率水平。
This paper uses Berthold’s price competition model to study how two local governments set tax rates to compete for a foreign-invested project. It analyzes the impact of the similarities and differences of investment environment on the equilibrium tax rate when the value of the enterprise investment in different regions consists of public information and private information. If the investment environment is homogeneous, the tax rate of the two local governments will be zero when the tax rate is balanced. If the investment environment is different for the enterprises, the equilibrium tax rate is greater than zero. The equilibrium tax rate in both cases is lower than the tax rate when the social welfare is maximized.