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根据国际预算合作组织提供的量化评估(2006~2012年),世界上财政透明度平均水平不高,我国财政透明度更低,因此在政府与公众博弈中双方如何合理利用博弈规则谋求收益最大化是一个具有重要现实意义的研究课题。本文在完全信息的假设条件下,基于Rubinstein轮流出价的讨价还价模型,对政府与公众财政透明度进行了博弈分析和仿真,从贴现因子、信息时间价值、直接成本、机会成本等几个方面对模型进行了全面分析,提出了有限期和无限期博弈精炼纳什均衡公式,对我国提高公众和立法机构的讨价还价能力、增加政府讨价还价成本和提高政府财政透明度提出了几点建议。
According to the quantitative evaluation provided by the International Organization for Budget Cooperation (2006-2012), the average level of fiscal transparency in the world is not high and the fiscal transparency in our country is lower. Therefore, it is a matter of how the two sides make rational use of the rules of the game to maximize returns in the game between the government and the public Research topic of great practical significance. Under the assumption of complete information, based on Rubinstein’s round bargaining model, this paper conducts a game analysis and simulation on the transparency of the government and public finances. The model is carried out from the aspects of discount factor, information time value, direct cost and opportunity cost After a comprehensive analysis, this paper puts forward the finite and indefinite game-Nash equilibrium formula, and puts forward some suggestions to improve the bargaining power of the public and the legislature, increase the government bargaining cost and improve the government’s fiscal transparency.