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近年来,我国钢铁企业在铁矿砂谈判方面一直处于弱势,不是拿不到谈判权,就是即使争取到谈判权也得不到定价权。本文通过构造一个二级供应链,建立了垄断供应商和制造商在非合作状态下的多个不同谈判博弈模型,利用逆向归纳法求出了垄断供应商和制造商在不同谈判模式下的非合作均衡解,通过比较不同谈判模式下垄断供应商、制造商以及供应链系统收益的大小,提出了存在一种谈判模式能使系统效率提高,即垄断供应商选择与处于终端产品行业中领导地位的制造商进行谈判而确定的垄断价格将使其收益最大,并使整个供应链系统在非合作状态下的效率更接近理想状态,从而解释了我国钢铁企业在铁矿砂谈判中处于劣势的原因。
In recent years, China’s iron and steel enterprises have been in a weak position in iron ore negotiations, either because they can not get the bargaining power or even get bargaining power even after they have won the bargaining power. By constructing a two-level supply chain, this paper establishes a number of different negotiation game models of monopoly suppliers and manufacturers in non-cooperative state, and uses the reverse induction method to find the monopoly suppliers and manufacturers in different negotiation modes Cooperation and equilibrium solution. By comparing the benefits of monopoly suppliers, manufacturers and supply chain systems under different negotiation modes, a negotiation mode is proposed to improve system efficiency, that is, monopolistic supplier selection and leading position in the end product industry Of the manufacturers to negotiate to determine the monopoly price will maximize its benefits and make the entire supply chain system in a non-cooperative state closer to the ideal efficiency, thus explaining the reasons for China’s iron and steel enterprises in iron ore negotiations at a disadvantage .