任何科学都由两种类型的陈述构成:一是对事实的以经验为依据的陈述,通过观察而获致,是确实可靠和无可争辩的;另一种是理论陈述,它是思辨的,常因观念的转变而变化莫测。据此,我们搜集到全部相关事实,就会编织和系统提出各种理论以阐释或使之符合这些事实。事实和理论的划分,已在人类学的民族志(对各种文化的描述)和民族学(对描述的理论化)之间的区别中留下深刻的烙印,但这种两分法却往往导人误入歧途。什么是支持一种理论的有关事实?该如何观察它们?认为我们能够记录全部事实的看法,显然是荒谬的。观察和筛选事实,只能通过兴趣、事先假定和已有经验来实现。而且,全部描述都不可避免地渗透着我们的理论思考。认为存在纯粹描述的观念是一个错误的观念。朱利安·斯图尔德在其著名论文《文化的因果关系和法则》的结尾中,正确有力地阐明了这一点。他说:“搜集事实本身便是不充分的科学程序,事实只存在于同理论的联系之中;理论并非被事实推翻,而是被新的更宜于解释事实的理论所替代。” Any science consists of two types of statements: one is an empirical evidence-based statement of fact that is obtained through observation and is truly reliable and indisputable; the other is theoretical statements that are speculative and often Due to changes in the concept of unpredictable. Accordingly, we collect all the relevant facts, weaving and systematically put forward various theories to explain or make it consistent with these facts. The division of facts and theories has been deeply imprinted on the distinction between ethnographic anthropology (description of cultures) and ethnology (theorization of description), but this dichotomy tends to Guide people astray. What is the relevant fact in support of a theory? How to observe them? It is obviously absurd to think that we can record all the facts. Observation and screening of facts can only be achieved through interest, prior assumptions and prior experience. Moreover, all the descriptions inevitably permeate our theoretical thinking. It is a false notion to think that there is a purely descriptive idea. Julian Steuer spelled out that rightly and effectively at the conclusion of his famous essay, “The Cause and Effect of Culture.” He said: “The collection of facts is an inadequate scientific procedure in itself, and the fact exists only in the connection with the theory. The theory is not overthrown by facts, but replaced by new theories that are more suitable for the interpretation of facts.”