在“厂网分离、竞价上网”改革模式中,作为电网垄断企业的电力公司可以选择竞价采购,也可以选择销售权拍卖。本文比较了在标准拍卖模式下,二者给电力公司、发电商和用电户带来的期望效用以及社会福利的差别,结果发现竞价采购机制能够给电力公司带来更大的期望效用,但社会福利与效率受到损失。这就解释了电力公司更加偏好竞价采购模式而非销售权拍卖的原因。 In the “factory network separation, bidding Internet” reform model, as a power grid monopoly enterprises can choose to purchase auction, you can also choose the right to sell auction. This paper compares the expected utility and social welfare brought by the two to power companies, power producers and consumers under the standard auction model. The results show that bidding procurement mechanism can bring greater expected utility to power companies. However, Social welfare and efficiency are lost. This explains the reason why power companies prefer the auction model rather than the sales auction.