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以2005年中国269家民营上市公司为样本,实证检验了资本结构决策中存在的终极股东代理问题。研究发现,终极股东的控制权、制衡度和现金流权与受控公司资产负债率显著负相关。这表明,在受控民营上市公司资本结构决策中,终极股东控制权比例和制衡度越高,股权融资给终极股东带来的控制权稀释风险越低,终极股东偏好股权融资;终极股东现金流权比例越低,终级股东承担的债务破产风险越小,终极股东偏好债务融资。研究结论一方面支持资本结构具有公司治理效应,另一方面证实了终极股东在资本结构决策中确实存在主动规避治理效应的动机和行为。
Based on the sample of 269 private listed companies in China in 2005, this paper empirically tests the ultimate shareholder representation in the capital structure decision-making. The study found that ultimate shareholders’ control, checks and balances and cash flow rights and the controlled company’s debt ratio was significantly negatively correlated. This shows that in the controlled private listed companies capital structure decision-making, the ultimate shareholders control the higher the proportion and checks and balances, equity financing to the ultimate shareholders dilution of control risk is lower, the ultimate shareholders preferred equity financing; ultimate shareholder cash flow The lower the percentage of ownership, the lower the risk of debt bankruptcy borne by the ultimate shareholders, and the ultimate shareholder prefers debt financing. On the other hand, it confirms the motivation and behavior of the ultimate shareholder in the existence of the active avoidance governance effect in the capital structure decision-making.