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由于对《观念Ⅰ》时期胡塞尔根本立场的不完全理解,施泰因的同感现象学的研究起点与研究目标之间存在着不协调。一方面,同感现象学研究的起点是胡塞尔的“先验现象学”式的,这意味着对同感现象学的本质分析将集中于现象学还原以后的纯粹意识领域;另一方面,同感现象学研究的目标或意图在一定意义上又是实在论现象学式的,或者是一种“现象学的实在论”。施泰因从根本上拒绝将构造问题与“观念论”的立场相联,最终,她所发展的就既不是传统的实在论,也不是传统的观念论,而是一种特殊的、温和的先验观念论。
Due to the incomplete understanding of Husserl’s fundamental position during the “Concept I”, Stein’s researches on the phenomenology of sympathy exist between the starting point and the research goal. On one hand, Husserl’s “transcendental phenomenology” is the starting point for the study of sympathetic phenomenology, which means that the essential analysis of sympathetic phenomenology will focus on purely conscious fields after phenomenological reduction; on the other hand In a certain sense, the goal or intention of researches in empathy phenomenology is the phenomenology of realism, or a kind of “realism of phenomenology”. Stein fundamentally refused to associate the issue of construction with the position of “Concept Theory ”. In the end, what she developed was neither traditional realism nor traditional concept of thought, but rather a special, Gentle transcendental notion of ideas.