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承运人联盟中,各成员追求各自收益最大化,成员与联盟的最优决策往往是不一致的,因而导致联盟不稳定.承运人面对产生的需求有2种选择:接受或拒绝.考虑该约束条件,在一个由承运人联盟运营的航运物流网络的基础上,以合作博弈理论和数学规划为框架建立了承运人联盟的合作博弈模型,并设计了运力互租价格为核心的收益分摊机制,该机制为联盟成员提供了补偿性支付.分别对联盟和成员的决策过程进行数学建模,运用逆优化技术使得两者的最优决策一致,进而实现了联盟和合作的可持续性.
In the carrier alliance, each member pursues the maximization of their respective benefits, and the optimal decision-making between the members and the alliance is often inconsistent, which leads to the instability of the alliance.The carrier has two choices in face of the generated demand: acceptance or rejection. Conditions, based on a shipping logistics network operated by the carrier alliance, a cooperative game model of the carrier alliance is established based on the cooperation game theory and mathematical programming. The revenue sharing mechanism with the cross-renting capacity of transportation is also designed. This mechanism provides compensatory payment to alliance members.Mathematical modeling of the decision-making process of the alliance and its members, using the inverse optimization technology to make the optimal decision-making of the two consistent, and then to achieve the alliance and the cooperation of sustainability.