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基于我国企业股权集中度高且控股股东不能充分分散特质风险的现实背景,本文从市场非完备的视角研究控股股东控制权、现金流权以及两权分离程度对公司价值和资本结构选择的影响,进而探析控股股东侵占行为的内在作用机制。数值分析表明:控股股东侵占行为导致企业负债融资保守并提前违约;相对于完备市场,非完备市场下控股股东扭曲资本结构决策进行价值侵占的程度更高;控股股东的现金流权产生了公司治理的激励负效应,这为相关实证发现提供了理论支撑;加强投资者保护以及积极改善公司内部治理结构,如降低控股股东财富的风险暴露,是减轻控股股东侵占行为的有效途径。
Based on the factual background of the high degree of ownership concentration of Chinese enterprises and the controlling shareholders’ inability to fully disperse the trait risk, this article studies the influence of controlling shareholder, cash flow right and the separation degree of two rights on the selection of corporate value and capital structure from the perspective of market imperfection. Then analyzes the inherent mechanism of the controlling shareholder’s appropriation. The numerical analysis shows that controlling shareholders’ encroachment causes the corporate debt financing to be conservative and to default early. Compared with the complete market, the controlling shareholder distorts the capital structure decision in the incomplete market to the extent of the value encroachment. The cash flow right of the controlling shareholder gives rise to corporate governance Which provides the theoretical support for the relevant empirical findings. It is an effective way to reduce the controlling shareholder’s encroachment by strengthening investor protection and actively improving the internal governance structure, such as reducing the risk exposure of the controlling shareholder’s wealth.