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中国地方政府对突发性事件响应呈现出反应不足和过度反应两个极端。根源在于压力型垂直控制体制下的干部考核制度,使得地方领导人更多考虑上级对应急管理工作的政治要求以及技术可行性、有效性,对成本可行性或有效性重视不够。而基于经济学视野下的成本——收益分析方法,则主张从经济的合理性角度来分析和确定适度的应急响应行为和合理的安全保证程度,强调应急响应应该以最小的代价实现最大的安全目标。理想的应对策略应当是:明确中央和地方的责权,建立两者间责任分担机制,实现相互间信息共享、风险共防、责任共担,从而优化应急响应行为,实现适度的应急响应行为和合理的安全保证程度,而不是忽视问题的缩小化响应或浪费资源的扩大化响应。
Chinese local governments respond to unexpected events showing both underreaction and overreaction. The root cause lies in the cadre examination system under the pressure-type vertical control system, which makes the local leaders pay more attention to the political requirements of higher-level emergency management work as well as technical feasibility and effectiveness, and pay insufficient attention to the feasibility or effectiveness of the cost. Based on the economics of cost-benefit analysis, this paper advocates the analysis and determination of appropriate emergency response behavior and reasonable degree of security assurance from the perspective of economic rationality. It emphasizes that emergency response should achieve maximum security with minimum cost aims. The ideal coping strategies should be to clarify the responsibility and authority of the central and local authorities, establish a mechanism of sharing responsibilities between the two, and achieve mutual information sharing, risk prevention and sharing of responsibilities so as to optimize emergency response behavior and achieve appropriate emergency response behavior. Reasonable degree of security assurance, rather than ignore the problem of narrowing response or waste of resources to expand the response.