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本文以2003—2009年沪深A股主板上市公司为样本,采用配对检验和多元回归的方法,研究了终极控股股东与会计稳健性“有效需求不足假说”和“利益侵占假说”。研究发现:(1)终极控股股东控制权比率越高的组,会计稳健性越小,即或有控股样本公司会计稳健性高于相对控股组样本公司,而相对控股样本组公司又高于绝对控股组样本公司;(2)终极控股股东控制权与所有权分离程度越大,会计稳健性越低;(3)终极控股股东为国有性质的公司会计稳健性高于民营性质的公司。本文的研究深化了我们对新兴市场国家制度环境下会计稳健性理解,同时对进一步规范会计稳健性相关的制度安排和监管具有重要的启示和政策意义。
This paper takes the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2009 as samples, and studies the ultimate controlling shareholder and accounting conservatism “the hypothesis of insufficient effective demand ” and “the theory of benefit encroachment ” with the method of paired test and multiple regression. . The results show that: (1) The higher accounting control ratio of the ultimate controlling shareholder, the smaller the accounting conservatism, that is, the accounting firmness of the controlling sample companies is higher than the relative controlling sample companies and the relative controlling sample group is higher than the absolute (2) the greater the degree of separation of control and ownership from the ultimate controlling shareholder, the lower the accounting conservatism; (3) The ultimate controlling shareholder is a state-owned company whose accounting soundness is higher than that of the non-state-owned company. The research in this paper deepens our understanding of the soundness of accounting under the institutional environment of emerging countries and at the same time it has important enlightenment and policy significance for further regulating the institutional arrangement and regulation of accounting conservatism.