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本文分析一项创造了巨额租金的准入管制突然被废除的原因。基本观点是,一项新技术的发明提高了执法成本,鼓励了更多的非法进入,使得原来支持着管制的租值消散了。1998年,中国建立了手机生产的牌照管制。该制度为牌照获得者创造了巨额垄断租金。2003年,一个集成芯片技术发明出现,显著降低了手机生产成本。紧接着,数以千计的无牌照生产者开始生产手机。由于竞争加剧,持有牌照的生产者遭受巨额损失,许多濒于破产。由于新技术使生产成本剧减,维护牌照垄断的执法成本则急升。监管者曾尝试寻求地方政府和电信网络运营商的协助以打击非法手机,但是后两者不愿提供帮助,因为他们都是繁荣的非法手机产业的受益者。
This article analyzes the reasons for the abolition of an access control that created a huge rent. The basic idea is that the invention of a new technology has raised the cost of law enforcement and encouraged more illegal entry, dissipating the original rental values that supported regulation. In 1998, China established a license control system for handset production. The system creates huge monopoly rents for licensees. In 2003, an integrated chip technology invention appeared, significantly reducing the cost of mobile phones. Then, thousands of unlicensed producers started to make cell phones. Due to increased competition, the number of licensee producers suffers a huge loss and many are on the verge of bankruptcy. Due to the drastic reduction of production costs due to new technologies, the enforcement costs of maintaining the monopoly of licenses soared. Regulators have tried to seek the help of local governments and telecommunications network operators to crack down on illegal cell phones, but the latter two are reluctant to help because they are both beneficiaries of the booming illicit handset industry.