论文部分内容阅读
本文基于31个省级流通领域的食品案件数量及食品违规处罚数据,采用负二项回归等方法实证检验财政分权背景下地方政府对食品监管及违规处罚的激励。研究结果显示,在控制人口、人均GDP与前一期地方政府食品监督努力水平等影响因素的条件下,财政分权度与食品案件数量显著正相关,财政自主度与食品违规处罚金额也显著正相关。这表明,在财政分权制度背景下,地方食品安全监管部门对罚款收入的偏好可能致使监管者并不是基于安全关注而提高对食品案件的监管力度,进而导致违规处罚的激励发生扭曲。应提高考核地方政府的评价指标体系中对安全监管效果方面的权重,加强对地方政府在食品违规处罚方面的监督,并确保处罚行为与标准的规范性及省际间的一致性。
Based on the data of food cases and food non-compliance penalties in 31 provincial-level circulation areas, this paper empirically tests the incentives of local governments for food regulatory and non-compliance penalties in the context of fiscal decentralization by using negative binomial regression and other methods. The results show that under the conditions of controlling the population, per capita GDP and the level of local government food supervision efforts in the previous period, the fiscal decentralization has a significant positive correlation with the number of food cases. The fiscal autonomy and the amount of food non-compliance penalties are also significantly positive Related. This shows that in the context of fiscal decentralization, the preference of local food safety regulatory authorities for fine income may cause regulators not to raise regulatory concerns over food cases based on safety concerns, which in turn leads to distorting incentives for non-compliance. The evaluation of the evaluation index system of local government should strengthen the supervision on the effectiveness of safety supervision, strengthen the supervision of local governments in food non-compliance penalties, and ensure the normativity of punishments and standards and the inter-provincial consistency.