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文章考察了2008年前后宏观经济剧烈波动的环境下,我国企业为实现预期高管薪酬而实施的盈余管理策略变化情况。基于2003-2014年499家A股公司平衡面板数据的研究结果表明,在金融危机前,企业应计盈余管理显著提升了高管薪酬,而真实盈余管理则明显抑制了高管薪酬增长。在金融危机后,企业应计盈余管理对高管薪酬的提升作用减弱,真实盈余管理对高管薪酬的阻滞作用也减弱。其中,私营企业高管薪酬对两种盈余管理敏感性的减弱程度最大,地方国企次之,中央国企最小。进一步研究发现,私营企业在金融危机后即转变了盈余管理策略,而国有企业则在国家经济刺激政策完全退出后才出现这一变化。文章结果表明,宏观经济不景气降低了企业高管维持高薪的预期,从而刺激他们采取更具风险的盈余管理策略,这为企业中长期发展埋下了隐患。
The article examines the macroeconomic volatility around 2008 before and after the situation, the Chinese enterprises in order to achieve the expected executive pay and the implementation of the earnings management strategy changes. Based on the data of 499 A-share companies’ balanced panel data from 2003 to 2014, the results show that before the financial crisis, corporate accrued earnings management significantly improved executive compensation, while real earnings management significantly inhibited the growth of executive compensation. After the financial crisis, corporate accruals of earnings management to enhance the role of executive compensation weakened, real earnings management, the role of the executive compensation has also been weakened. Among them, the sensitivity of executive compensation of private enterprises to the two kinds of earnings management weakened the most, followed by local state-owned enterprises, the central state-owned enterprises is the smallest. Further research found that the private sector changed its earnings management strategy after the financial crisis, while the state-owned enterprises changed only after the state’s economic stimulus policy was completely withdrawn. The article shows that the macroeconomic downturn has lowered the expectations of senior executives in maintaining high salaries, thereby stimulating them to adopt more risky earnings management strategies, laying a hidden danger for the long-term development of the enterprise.