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国企改革是我国实施全面深化改革的“重头戏”。国有企业兼并重组改革是化解产能过剩、构建规模经济,促使中国经济转型的重要驱动力。经典SSR模型认为,由于合并经营使得参与方利润减少,因此企业不存在横向兼并的激励。然而,这一结论无法对现实经济中国有企业横向兼并重组给出合理的解释。通过对SSR模型的修正和推导,研究发现,如果兼并发生后市场结构发生了变化,合并后的企业成为了Stackelberg领导者,那么即使基准SSR模型的其它部分保持不变,企业参与横向兼并也变得有利可图。这为我国国有企业合并重组改革提供了理论支撑;进一步的案例研究发现,这一修正的SSR模型能够较好地解释现实中国有企业的横向兼并现象。
The reform of state-owned enterprises is the “main event” in the implementation of the comprehensively deepening reform in our country. The reform of mergers and acquisitions of state-owned enterprises is an important driving force for resolving overcapacity, building economies of scale and facilitating China’s economic restructuring. The classic SSR model argues that there is no incentive for horizontal mergers in a business as a result of a merger that reduces the profits of the participants. However, this conclusion can not give a reasonable explanation for the horizontal mergers and acquisitions of Chinese enterprises in real economy. Through the revision and derivation of the SSR model, we find that if the market structure changes after the merger, and the merged enterprise becomes the leader of Stackelberg, even if other parts of the benchmark SSR model remain unchanged, the enterprises participate in the horizontal merger Profitable. This provides theoretical support for the SOE merger and reorganization reform in China. Further case studies show that this modified SSR model can better explain the real Chinese horizontal mergers.