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企业和政府是创新的两个博弈主体,他们对博弈决策的选择是一个动态调整的过程。本文选用进化博弈理论为工具,建立创新进化博弈模型,分析博弈主体在模仿复制过程中的策略选择。分析结果告诉我们,政府完善的激励制度是企业进行技术创新的保障,而企业对技术创新的热情则是政府进行制度创新的原动力;博弈的进化均衡是政府从制度上确保降低企业创新的外部成本以激励企业进行创新,企业则选择持续创新以追逐创新收益。
Enterprise and government are the two main players of innovation. Their choice of game decision-making is a dynamic adjustment process. In this paper, the evolutionary game theory as a tool, the establishment of innovative evolutionary game model, analysis of game players in imitation copy strategy selection. The result of the analysis tells us that the government’s perfect incentive system is the guarantee for technological innovation of enterprises and the enthusiasm of enterprises for technological innovation is the driving force behind the government’s institutional innovation. The evolutionary equilibrium of the game is that the government systematically ensures that the external costs of innovation are reduced In order to motivate enterprises to innovate, enterprises choose to innovate continually in pursuit of innovative benefits.