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中国城市的出租车市场普遍采取数量控制和服务价格的双重管制。数量控制是政府通过设置行政性进入壁垒对在位企业实施保护,创造了租金的同时也形成了寻租利益集团。基于调研和官方数据、边缘性进入模型,分析了网约车平台对出租车市场结构的影响。主要结论是,网约车的边缘性进入降低了管制者的福利和出租车公司的利润,在位企业的垄断“租金”在这种进入下不具有可维持性。基于出租车运行现状的调研的分析表明,对网约车的严厉管制或将导致社会福利的净损失。政府应该从社会公共利益出发,逐步解除出租车市场进入的行政壁垒,通过设立运营车辆服务质量标准的注册制替代数量的行政控制,由经济性管制转向社会性规制。
Taxi markets in Chinese cities generally take the dual control of quantity control and service prices. The quantitative control is that the government implements the protection of the incumbent enterprises by setting administrative barriers to entry, and creates rent while forming a rent-seeking interest group. Based on the research and official data, the marginality model is introduced to analyze the impact of network-based car platform on taxi market structure. The main conclusion is that the marginal entry of a network car reduces the regulator’s welfare and the profits of a taxi company, and the monopoly “rent ” of the incumbent firm is not maintainable under such an entry. An analysis based on surveys of the current status of taxi operations shows that harsh regulation of on-boarding vehicles can result in a net loss of social welfare. The government should start from the public interest in society and gradually lift the administrative barriers to the entry of the taxi market. From economic control to social regulation, a number of administrative controls should be replaced by the establishment of a registration system that operates a service standard for quality of service.