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要解决保密增强中的防主动攻击的问题 ,就必须对公共信道上的通信内容进行认证 .文中提出并分析了一种新的用纠错码构造认证码的方法 ,这种认证码构造简单且对域 GF (q)上的任意一个码都找到一个相应的认证码 .如果通信双方共享一个 nbit的部分保密串 S,则可以构造一种基于 (2 m,k,2 m - k +1)扩展 RS码的认证码 ,其中 m =n/k且 2 m>k,只要双方间共享一个至少 3mbit的认证密钥 ,就有可能在一个不安全且非认证的公共信道上实现一个强保密增强协议 ,使得敌手主动攻击成功的概率不超过 k/2 m,提取出的高度保密串的长度约为敌手关于 S的 Rényi熵的大小 .且当 n足够大时 ,总能提取出多于 3mbit的秘密信息 ,因此协议是实用的
To solve the problem of anti-active attack in privacy enhancement, it is necessary to authenticate the communication content on the public channel.This paper proposes and analyzes a new method of constructing authentication code using error correction code, which is simple in construction Find a corresponding authentication code for any one of the codes GF (q) over GF (q). If both parties share a partial secret string S of nbit, then we can construct an authentication code based on (2 m, k, 2 m - k +1) Extending the authentication code of the RS code, where m = n / k and 2 m> k, it is possible to implement a strong privacy enhancement on an insecure and non-certified common channel as long as both parties share a cryptographic key of at least 3 mbit Protocol so that the probability of an opponent’s active attack succeeds is no more than k / 2m, and the length of the extracted highly secure sequence is about the size of the Rényi entropy of the opponent about S. And when n is large enough, more than 3mbit Secret information, so the agreement is practical