股权激励可以减少现代企业两权分离所产生的代理成本过高、内部人控制严重的现象。但是股权激励发挥效率是基于一系列前提条件的,如资本市场条件、成本效用原则与业绩约束原则等。当这些条件不具备,而又缺乏严格监管的情况下,股权激励不仅达不到上述目标,反而会加剧委托代理问题。笔者通过分析海南海药股权激励案产生公司巨额 Equity incentive can reduce the high cost of agency caused by the separation of ownership of two modern enterprises, and the insiders control the serious phenomenon. However, the efficiency of equity incentive is based on a series of preconditions, such as capital market conditions, cost-effectiveness principle and performance constraint principle. When these conditions do not have, but the lack of strict supervision, equity incentives not only fail to achieve the above objectives, but will aggravate the commission agency problem. The author through the analysis of Hainan Haiyao equity incentive case generated a huge company