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本文从政治经济学的角度探讨了1998年后中国的垄断性部门与竞争性部门间的工资差距不断扩大的原因。1998年前,国有企业同时控制着垄断性部门和竞争性部门,为了平衡两个部门的利益,政府限制了垄断性部门的价格和利润;而在1998年后,国有企业基本退出了竞争性部门,政府偏袒垄断性部门,放松了对其的定价限制。在垄断性部门的定价水平高于边际成本的条件下,两部门之间的工资差距随着竞争性部门占整体经济的比重提高而扩大。实证结果表明,这一关系只存在于1998年之后。
This article explores the reasons for the widening wage gap between monopolistic and competitive sectors in China after 1998 from the perspective of political economy. Before 1998, state-owned enterprises controlled both monopolistic and competitive sectors. In order to balance the interests of the two sectors, the government restricted the prices and profits of monopoly sectors. After 1998, the state-owned enterprises basically dropped out of the competitive sector , The government favors the monopoly sector and relaxes its pricing restrictions. With monopoly sectors pricing above marginal cost, the wage gap between the two sectors widened as the proportion of competitive sectors to the overall economy expanded. The empirical results show that this relationship exists only after 1998.